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FLAG BURNING, FLAG WAVING AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
The flag burning incidents during the Spring of 1967 demonstrated
a new method of protesting against American involvement in Vietnam.'
President Lyndon B. Johnson's commitment to a policy of escalation
produced widespread opposition. Reacting to the increasing clamor of
dissent, the President actively enlisted supporters to augment public
acceptance of his policy.! Opponents of the war felt they lacked cor-
respondingly effective access to the media.' Whether their contention was
correct was unimportant. The significant fact was that their fear of
failing to reach the public led them to adopt the alternative tactic of
demonstration-the "poor man's printing press."' Of all the methods
of demonstration, none attracted the attention of the public more than the
burning of the American flag.
The subject of this note is whether flag desecration, as an act of
protest, is protected by the First Amendment.5 An attempt is made to
illustrate the legislative and judicial treatment of the subject. To date,
legislators and judges have been reluctant to treat flag desecration as a
First Amendment issue. It is submitted, however, that a First Amendment
issue does, indeed, exist. Moreover, the methods employed by the courts
to solve First Amendment problems offer no simple solution to the issue
of flag desecration. The emotional attachment of the general public to the
national symbol poses the primary difficulty. Before deciding to protect
the sensitivities of its citizens, perhaps the state should consider whether
that task is a function of the law.
FLAGS ANiS THE LAW
Only in comparatively recent history has the flag become a significant
symbol of national government. The demise of Kingship, the emergence
of the nation-state and the importance of gathering citizens to fight in
wartime are possible factors in this development.' Historically, the people
1. See N.Y. Times, March 24, 1967, at 25, col. 1; Id., April 15, 1967, at 36, col. 4;
Id., April 16, 1967, at 1, col. 3; Id., April 19, 1967, at 3, col. 4; Id., April 20, 1967, at
23, col. 8; Id., May 13, 1967, at 17, col. 2.
2. For a forceful account of these events, see Finman & McCaulay, Freedom to Dis-
sent: The Viet Nam Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. Rxv. 632.
3. Id. at 683.
4. The use of the "poor man's printing press" is illustrated in Kalven, The Concept
of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SuP. CT. REv. 1, 30 (Kurland ed. 1965).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. For a history on flags, see 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Flag 454 (11th ed.
1910).
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of the United States have shown a definite attachment to a flag. Indeed,
such attachment inspired the national anthem. During the War Be-
tween the States a man was hung in New Orleans for desecrating the
Union flag.7 Yet, significantly, it was not until 1942 that Congress
enacted a flag code providing guidelines for the proper use of the national
emblem.' Concern for the flag appears to be more profound in the United
States than in most other countries, and since the turn of the century this
concern has greatly increased.'
Improper treatment of the flag first became a legal issue during the
1890's after the founding of the American Flag Association.1" The
Association sought legislation to curb the use of the flag in political
campaigns and advertising. Taking its grievance to the states, the
Association argued that when political candidates used the flag in the
campaign of 1896, hostile audiences often mutilated it, thus provoking
street fights.1
Between 1895 and 1906 twenty-eight states enacted statutes pro-
hibiting the use of the flag in advertising.12 Most of those statutes
stated that "[no person shall] publicly mutilate, deface, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon [the flag]. '"18 Two state
courts subsequently held that the clause prohibiting the use of the flag in
commercial advertising violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" In Halter v. Nebraska,5 however, the United States
Supreme Court upheld such a statute. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
Court, stressed the reasonableness of the restraint on advertising and the
importance of the flag as a national symbol.'" Only Justice Peckham
dissented, without opinion.'
The "red scare" at the outbreak of World War I evoked a new
7. Fleming, Hail to the Flag!, READER's DIGEST, April, 1969, at 185.
8. Flag Code Resolution, 36 U.S.C. §§ 171-82 (1964).
9. It is difficult to document the absence of an attitude. Compare the history of
flag usage in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Flag 454 (11th ed. 1910). For the years in
which flag protection statutes were enacted, see Appendix.
10. See Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 48 (1966).
11. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1906) ; People v. Von Rosen, 13 Il1. 2d 68,
147 N.E.2d 327 (1958) ; People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967) ; People
ex rel. McPike v. Van de Carr, 178 N.Y. 475, 70 N.E. 965 (1904).
12. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 39 n.1 (1906).
13. See Appendix.
14. Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900) ; People ex rel. McPike v.
Van de Carr, 178 N.Y. 475, 70 N.E. 965 (1904).
15. 205 U.S. 34 (1906).
16. Id. at 42-43.
17. Justice Peckham was vehemently opposed to any regulation of business. See
Skolnik, Rufuw Peckham, 3 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789 TO
1969, at 1685-1703 (1969). On the other hand, Justice Harlan frequently voted to sustain
regulatory statutes which he deemed reasonable. Filler, John M. Harlan, 2 JUSTIcES OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789 TO 1969, at 1281-94 (1969).
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FLAG AND THE LAW
concern among the state legislators, prompting them to condemn con-
spiracies to overthrow the government." During this period, the re-
maining states enacted appropriate statues, usually with higher penalties.
The Texas statute, passed in 1918, punished flag burning by imprison-
ment from two to twenty-five years.'
During the 1940's, the refusal of the Jehovah's Witnesses to salute
the flag aroused heated debate.2" The Supreme Court apparently resolved
the issue in Minersville School District v. Gobitis," ruling that the state
could compel school children to salute the flag. The Court, however,
reversed itself in 1943.2 Another 1943 decision declared unconstitu-
tional a statute prohibiting the dissemination of teachings calculated to
create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute the flag.28 In 1967, how-
ever, the Georgia and New York courts tested and upheld the con-
stitutionality of their flag desecration statutes."
Before discussing the recent Supreme Court treatment of flag
burning it is important to analyze the judicial treatment of draft card
burning cases, since both involve the unlawful destruction of property to
express a political viewpoint. On August 30, 1965, Congress passed an
act prohibiting draft card destruction. 2' The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Miller,'2 recognized an abridgement of speech by the statute,
but maintained that the slight infringement was clearly outweighed by the
administrative advantage of the registrant's continual possession of his
draft card. The First Circuit, however, declared the statute unconstitu-
18. See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 55-66 (1967).
19. See Texas statute in Appendix.
20. For an excellent discussion of the issue during the 1940's see D. MANWARING,
RENDER UNTO CAESAR (1962).
21. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
22. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943) (declaring ch. 178, § 1, [1942] Miss.
Laws unconstitutional). See also Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942)
(affirming conviction for calling the flag a "rag") ; State v. Smith, 155 Kan. 158, 127
P.2d 518 (1942) (reversing conviction for refusing to salute).
24. Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967) (flag desecration during
civil rights demonstration) ; People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967)
(flag burning by Negro incensed at James Meredith shooting); People v. Radich, 53
Misc. 2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Crin Ct. 1967), af'd,--N.Y.2d-,-N.F2d -
(1970), in 38 U.S.L.W. 2473 (March 10, 1970) (flag desecration in sculpture exhibit
protesting the Vietnam War) ; United States Flag Foundation, Inc. v. Radich, 53 Misc.
2d 597, 279 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (civil action arising from same sculpture pro-
test). See A Test Case for Old Glory, LIFE, March 31, 1967, at 18.
25. The Universal Military and Service Training Act, 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (Supp.
I, 1965) states:
Any person . . . (3) who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mu-
tilates, or in any manner changes . . . shall upon conviction, be fined not to
exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
26. 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tional, stressing the unreasonableness of the statute in light of a regula-
tion already in force requiring that the registrant have the card in his
possession at all times.27 The Supreme 'Court, in United States v.
O'Brien," adopted both the Second Circuit decision and its rationale.
Would the Court have stricken the statute had it found no reason for
requiring that registrants keep their draft cards? Admittedly, both the
government's interest and the abridgement of free expression were very
slight.29 The Court did not mention other government interests, namely,
the highly emotional response of the public to draft card burnings and
the need to demonstrate national commitment to the war in Vietnam.
Congress reacted to the flag burning incidents 0 in much the same
manner as it responded to the draft card burnings.' During the first
session of the Ninetieth Congress, members introduced ninety bills mak-
ing flag desecration a federal crime." Congress had enacted legislation on
the subject in 1917, but the federal statute applied only to the District of
Columbia." A subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee heard
testimony for five days.8 Most of the witnesses were House members
who had introduced bills on the subject.3" The American Civil Liberties
Union and several professors questioned the constitutionality of
the bills, 8 but the committee was unconvinced and reported one
of the bills favorably.3 The Congressional debate was boisterous,"8 and
after much patriotic rhetoric the House passed the bill 387 to 16." The
27. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967). For the possession
requirement see 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1959).
28. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
29. See O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967). The court men-
tions the importance of the registrant carrying his draft card at all times in case the
files are destroyed. Query, how will the draft board know who is to turn in his card
if there are no records? Will the registrant go to his draft board out of a sense of
obligation?
30. See note 1 supra.
31. For Congressional debates supporting a federal flag burning statute, see 113
CONG. REc. 948, 1760, 8497, 10007, 10042, 10319, 10320, 10380, 10647, 10849, 10898, 10902,
11464, 11681, 11695, 11697, 11703, 11727, 11919, 11923, 11935, 11977, 12042, 12044,
12046, 12303, 12306, 12378, 12792, 16442-98 (1967).
32. Id. at 16449.
33. Act of February 8, 1917, ch. 34, 39 Stat. 900 (repealed 1968).
34. See Hearings on H.R. 271 and Similar Proposals to Prohibit Desecration of the
Flag Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 4 (1967).
35. Id. at Index.
36. Id. at 136 (Lawrence Speiser of the A.C.L.U.) ; Id. at 233 (Edward Morris of
Bowling Green State University) ; Id. at 279 (Herbert 0. Reid of Howard University
School of Law) ; and Id. at 306 (Monroe H. Freedman of George Washington University
National Law Center).
37. 113 CONG. REc. 15530 (1967).
38. Id. at 16642-98.
39. Id. at 16498.
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Senate concurred without debate and the bill became law July 5, 1968.
The Flag Desecration Act punishes one "[who] knowingly casts con-
tempt upon the [flag] by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning,
or trampling upon it" by imprisonment up to one year and/or $1000
fine."0 According to the Congressional debates, the intent of the statute
is: 1) to insure uniformity throughout the states; 2) to make the federal
government the protector of the national emblem; 3) to stop demonstra-
tions that encourage the Hanoi government; 4) to protect the morale of
the Amercian servicemen; and 5) to protect the sensibilities of the
American citizens.4 '
The flag burning incident in Street v. New York 2 took place a year
before the widely publicized protests of 1967 which so inflamed the
Congress. Sidney Street, a black New York City bus driver, was listening
to the radio in his home on July 6, 1966, when he heard of the shooting
of civil rights demonstrator James Meredith. Street owned two flags, one
with forty-eight stars, the other with fifty stars. He took the forty-eight
starred flag, walked to a nearby corner with it folded under his arm, lit a
match to the flag and dropped it onto the pavement. About thirty people
gathered, but no disruption occurred. Police, attracted by the crowd, heard
Street say, "we don't need no damn flag !" When asked if he had burned
the flag, he replied: "Yes, that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that
happen to Meredith, we don't need no damn flag !"" The state charged
Street with violating the New York flag desecration statute which
states that no one shall "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample
upon, or cast contempt upon the flag either by words or acts."4 Street was
found guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 5 Street's appeal to the
United States Supreme Court 6 urged reversal on four grounds: 1) the
statute was overbroad as applied; 2) the statute was overbroad on its
face; 3) the statute was vague and indefinite; and 4) the statute punished
one who burned the flag as an act of protest and such protest is protected
by the First Amendment.
The Court, speaking through Justice Harlan, declared the statute
unconstitutional as applied and reversed the conviction.47 Neither the
indictment, the instructions nor the trial verdict specified whether Street
40. Flag Desecration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. IV, 1968).
41. 113 CONG. REc. 10007, 16442, 16459 (1967).
42. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
43. Id. at 579.
44. See Appendix. See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136 (McKinney 1968), for-
inerly N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425 (16) (d) (McKinney 1944).
45. People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 220 N.E.2d 187 (1967).
46. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
47. Id. at 594.
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was punished for his words or for his acts. The Court indicated that the
state conviction may have been for his words alone.48 Justice Harlan
contended that Street's verbal advocacy of his feelings towards the flag
was protected by the First Amendment."9 The reversal followed since the
conviction may have been unconstitutional.5" Justices Stewart, Marshall,
Brennan and Douglas joined Justice Harlan in his opinion. Justices
Black, Fortas, White and Chief Justice Warren dissented in separate
opinions.51 All of the dissenters reasoned that the Court stretched the
facts to avoid a decision as to the constitutionality of the statute and
stated explicitly that they would affirm the conviction."
Since Street, lower courts have continued to uphold flag desecration
statutes where the defendant has been convicted for an overt act. O'Brien"
has been heavily cited in the three federal decisions affirming convictions
for violating the federal flag desecration statute.5 A New York court
overruled the demurrer to an indictment against the editors of a college
newspaper which depicted a nude girl draped with a flag.55 In Cali-
fornia, the conviction of a man who wore a vest made from a flag was
affirmed.56 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the appellant's
case was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Justices
Harlan and Brennan concurred on the grounds that the record was
inadequate.58 Justice Douglas was of the opinion that probable jurisdic-
tion should have been noted." Although the majority did not state their
reason for dismissing the appeal, it may be assumed that the absence of a
First Amendment issue was decisive. The majority was apparently not
convinced that one expresses oneself by wearing a vest.
Thus, the attachment which Americans feel for their flag has been
48. Id. at 589-90.
49. Id. at 591. Justice Harlan cited Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949).
50. The Court relied heavily upon Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931),
where a general verdict under a statute prohibiting the flying of a red flag, for any one
of three reasons, was reversed because at least one of these reasons violated the First
Amendment.
51. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594, 609, 610, 615 (1969).
52. Id. at 605 (Warren, C.J. dissenting). The other justices issued shorter opinions
summarizing the views expressed by Chief Justice Warren.
53. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Joyce v.
United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d 567
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
55. People v. Keough, - Misc. 2d - , 305 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Monroe County Ct.
1969).
56. People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 174, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (Super. Ct. 1969).
57. Cowgill v. California, 90 S. Ct. 613 (1970).
58. Id. at 614.
59. Id. at 615.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/6
FLAG AND THE LAW
reflected in legislative and judicial decisions. Whether these decisions are
consistent with the Constitution is a question which the Supreme Court
has not faced.
FLAG DESECRATION AND FREE SPEECH
The Court in Street applied the First Amendment to the defendant's
words. Thus, the question of whether Street's acts constituted a First
Amendment problem was left unanswered.
It is submitted that the Court should not solve the flag burning
question by simply stating that the First Amendment is not involved.
The essential characteristic of a flag is its symbolic importance.6" Flag
burning is conduct symbolizing certain political ideas. The medium
conveys more sharply the message of the protestor."1 Yet, classifying all
conduct as symbolic speech would destroy the utility of the First Amend-
ment. To qualify as symbolic speech the "speaker" must intend that his
acts be interpreted as symbolic in nature and have a reasonable expecta-
tion that this will be accomplished."2 Since "the medium is the message,""
it is not important that the message be capable of verbalization.
The Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment rights in
cases where defendants wore black arm bands, 4 failed to salute the flag65
and waved a red flag. 6 In O'Brien, where protestors demonstrated their
political views by burning their draft cards, the Court also found a free
speech issue. Only after the Court had weighed the importance of this
particular form of expression with the interest of the Selective Service
System did it affirm the conviction. Likewise, the Court, in ruling on the
constitutionality of flag burning statutes, must consider the First Amend-
ment issue.
The Court has, in certain circumstances, stated that particular classes
of expression are beyond First Amendment protection.6" It may be
argued that flag burning is a "fighting word" as defined by Chaplinsky v.
New York"6 and, therefore, outside the First Amendment. The Court in
60. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1906).
61. See H. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
(1964).
62. These qualifications of symbolic behavior are suggested in Note, Symbolic Con-
duct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1117 (1968).
63. H. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964).
64. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
65. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
66. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
67. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity) ; Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel) ; Chaplinsky v. New York, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words).
68. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Chaplinsky limited the decision to abusive expressions directed to an
individual. The Court, however, has never extended it to speech, verbal
or symbolic, directed to a group.
The Supreme Court has recently struck down several statutes which
regulate First Amendment rights in a vague and indefinite manner."9
For the purpose of this note, it will be assumed that the flag desecration
statutes are sufficiently precise to pass the constitutional test.
The issue, then, is whether flag desecration as a means of protest is
protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has yet to adopt a
free speech theory applicable to all situations. Thus, several tests which
the Court has used must be considered.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The clear and present danger test, as enunciated by Justice Holmes,
allows the regulation of expression when that expression creates a clear
and present danger of producing an evil which the state has a right to
prevent.7" As the statutes are presently worded, the clear and present
danger test is ill-suited to solve the problem of flag desecration. While
none of the statutes indicate precisely what interest of the state requires
protection, it may be assumed that the legislatures were most concerned
with maintaining public order and respect for the nation's symbol."'
If public order was the concern which prompted the passage of flag
desecration statutes, the statutes meet constitutional difficulties on two
grounds. First, the statutes do not distinguish between circumstances
which pose a clear and present threat to public order and those circum-
stances which do not pose such danger. Thus, the statutes infringe on
nonobjectionable activities and are unconstitutionally overbroad. 2 To
cure this defect, the legislature should prohibit flag desecration only
where there is a clear and present danger of public disorder.
Secondly, the clear and present danger test has inherent difficulties
that have limited its use.7" The most 'serious of those is defining the
69. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S.
54 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ;
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Baggitt v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964).
70. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
71. See notes 29 and 32 supra and accompanying text.
72. The Supreme Court has recently struck down several statutes that are over-
broad on their face. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (Subversive Ac-
tivities Act relating to defense plants) ; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (loy-
alty oath) ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (statute regulat-
ing foreign corporations) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (statute regulating
solicitation of legal business).
73. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 910-12 (1963) ; McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1203-
12 (1959).
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proximity of danger required before the state may intervene. Branden-
berg v. Ohio provides the most recent interpretation of proximity.
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.7"
Aside from the difficulty of defining proximity, the clear and present
danger test conflicts with the underlying policy of the First Amendment.
The test provides protection only when the speaker's words have no
effect. As soon as the audience reacts to the speaker he is denied protec-
tion. The possibility that a hostile audience can "veto" the speaker's
right of free expression has led the Court to abandon the clear and
present danger test, even in the face of imminent riot.7"
The state's interest in promoting respect for the nation's flag would
not seem to justify the statute under the clear and present danger test.
Neither Congress nor the states have the power to compel respect. As
Justice Jackson declared in West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, "[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity
of the graveyard."" If the state cannot compel respect, it follows then that
the state cannot declare disrespect unlawful. Of course, the real interest of
those who wish to prohibit flag desecration is the survival and strength
of the country it symbolizes. It is highly unlikely that flag burning creates
a clear and present danger of weakening or resulting in the overthrow of
the United States government.
Bad Tendency Test
The bad tendency test asserts that "[freedom of speech] does not
protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the
government." 7 The state may punish "utterances inimical to the public
welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the peace, or endanger the
foundations of organized government by unlawful means."7 Because of
74. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
75. For cases where public order was seriously threatened yet the First Amend-
ment prevailed see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) ; Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ; Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) ;
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1951); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Cf. Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951).
76. 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
77. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
78. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
353
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the minimal protection provided for First Amendment rights, the Court
would not use this test today. The case that applied the test most clearly,
Whitney v. California,"' was explicitly overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio."0 The reason that this test deserves comment is not that the Court
would apply it, but that the general public might prefer it."'
Balancing Test
Justice Harlan defined the balancing test in Barenblatt v. United
States.
Where First Amendment rights are asserted . . . resolution of
the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances shown. 2
The sole determining factor in the application of the balancing test to
flag desecration statutes is the selection of the "competing private and
public interests." The respect and honor that citizens owe their country
outweighs the social value of Sidney Street's right to express himself by
burning the flag. On the other hand, the right of citizens to express
opposing political beliefs is far more vital to society than the maintenance
of a cloth symbol. Thus, by its choice of the competing interests, the
Court assures a certain result.8
It is doubtful that the Court would apply the balancing test today.
The test was first recognized in American Communications Association,
C.I.O. v. Douds4 in 1950. Although Douds and its legacy have never
been overruled, neither have they been followed since 1961.5 The cases
79. Id.
80. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
81. See H. McCloskey, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, in AMERICAN
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS 385 (1968). McCloskey's article deals with a recent Gal-
lup Poll showing that forty-seven percent of the people interviewed believed that the right
against self-incrimination interfered with the fight against subversion, Id. at 389; seventy-
seven percent felt that there was no freedom to be an atheist, Id. at 390; fifty percent in-
sisted that authors with "wrong" political beliefs did not deserve to have their books pub-
lished, Id. at 391; and twenty-five percent thought that the legal process was too slow
and unreiliable when dealing with Communists, Id. at 391.
82. 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
83. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 71 (1961) (Black, J.
dissenting) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (Black, J. dissenting) ;
Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L.
REV. 729, 746-49 (1963).
84. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
85. For cases applying the balancing test, see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). It is important to note that recent decisions
invalidating statutes relating to subversive activities have relied upon the vagueness and
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applying this test were concerned with maintaining national security."8
When society's interest in national security is balanced with the right of a
protestor to burn the American flag, the result is self-evident. The Court,
in recent years, has refused to affirm such a narrow conception of First
Amendment rights."
Meikeljohn Test
According to Dr. Alexander Meikeljohn, noted political scientist
and professor, the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect political
speech. Although not a lawyer, his conception of free speech has pro-
foundly affected the legal profession." His theory is best expressed by a
quotation from his book, Political Freedom.
In the town meeting, the people of the community assemble
to discuss and to act upon matters of public interest. . . . The
basic principle is that the freedom of speech shall be unabridged.
And yet the meeting cannot even be opened unless, by common
consent, speech is abridged. . . . [The moderator's] business
on its negative -side is to abridge speech. For example, it is
usually agreed that no one shall speak unless "recognized by the
chair." Also, debaters must confine their remarks to "the
question before the house." . . . If a speaker wanders from the
point at issue, if he is abusive or in other ways threatens to
defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be and should be de-
clared "out of order." . . . The town meeting, as it seeks for
freedom of public discussion of public problems, would be wholly
ineffectual unless speech were thus abridged. . . . It is not a
dialectical free-for-all. It is self government.
These speech-abridging activities of the town meeting in-
dicate what the First Amendment to the Constitution does not
forbid. When self-governing men demand freedom of speech
they are not saying that every individual has an unalienable
right to speak whenever, wherever, however he chooses ....
overbreadth doctrines and have not overruled the balancing test. See United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Baggitt v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
86. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959).
87. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. Since 1961, when the last case in-
volving the balancing test was decided, three of its five advocates have left the bench-
Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker in 1962, and Justice Clark in 1967.
88. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L REv. 1 (1965).
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. . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
that everything worth saying shall be said .... And this means
that though citizens may, on other grounds, be barred from
speaking, they may not be barred because their views are
thought to be false or dangerous. No plan of action shall be
outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair,
un-American. No speaker may be declared "out of order"
because we disagree with what he intends to say .... It is that
mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.
... The freedom of ideas shall not be abridged. 9
Thus, the Meikeljohn theory is applicable only when the state seeks
to regulate the content of speech. If the state justifies the flag desecration
statutes as an appropriate sanction upon a particularly obnoxious idea,
the statutes are unconstitutional according to the Meikejohn test. The
Court has implicitly adopted and explained the Meikeljohn theory in
several recent decisions. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the
Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, stated that debate on public
issues "shall be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may
include vehement, caustic, and unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials."91 Cox v. Louisiana2 ruled that the function
of free speech is to invite dispute." Using the rationale of Sullivan and
Cox, the Court upheld a state legislator's right to criticize American
involvement in Vietnam.9" The Court declared that "statements criticizing
public policy and the implementation of it must be . . . protected." 5 In
language easily applied to flag desecration statutes, the Court in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District" determined that
before the state can abridge expression, it must show that its action is
caused by more than a desire to escape a certain viewpoint. Thus, it is
evident that the legislature cannot prohibit the expression of a certain
message. If dissenters think society is oppressive and the Vietnam war is
immoral, they have the constitutional right to express their opinions.
Regulation of Time, Place and Manner
Advocates of the flag desecration statutes argue quite convincingly
89. A. MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-27 (1960).
90. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
91. Id. at 270.
92. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
93. Id. at 551.
94. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
95. Id. at 136.
96. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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that the purpose of the statutes is to prohibit one particular method of
expression rather than the specific message of the protestors."' The state
has the power to regulate the time, place and manner of expression."
When the Court rules on the constitutionality of these regulations, it
balances the interests of the state with the effect of the abridgement of
the First Amendment."'
It is important to note that where the Bill of Rights is involved, the
traditional deference to the state's legislative power does not restrain the
Court from reviewing state statutes."0 By declaring that the First
Amendment has a "preferred position" in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has assumed the role of "super-legislator" of all statutes which
affect that amendment. 1 ' Thus, the Court may, in determining the
constitutionality of the flag statutes, review both the appropriateness and
the effectiveness of the methods used to protect the state's interest. 2
Public Order
The states have enacted flag desecration statutes partially to prevent
the fightihg that might accompany the malicious destruction of the
97. See 113 ConG. REc. 10647, 16441-98 (1967).
98. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ; United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) ; Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 88 (1943) ; Jami-
son v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) ; Valantine v. Christianson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)
A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
99. Id.
100. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946) ; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ;
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) for a critical review of this practice.
101. See JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT (L. Levy ed. 1967); D.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1966).
102. The relationship between the First Amendment and judicial modesty was ex-
plored by Justice Rutledge in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
This case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to
say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice
on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place secured
by the First Amendment.
Id. at 529-30. In Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), which struck down a
statute prohibiting the distribution of hand-bills, the Court went so far as to suggest
alternative means to achieve the legislative purpose of preventing littering.
[I]f it is said that these means are efficient and convenient . . . the answer
is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge free-
dom of speech and press.
Id. at 164.
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flag."°' When viewed in light of such a purpose, these statutes are
unnecessary. If demonstrators burn the flag at a time and place where it
is reasonable to expect a public disturbance, and a disturbance does in
fact occur, they have unquestionably disturbed the peace-an offense in
every jurisdiction.' On the other hand, if one desecrates the flag where
no threat to public order exists and no distrubance occurs, neither has he
breached the peace, nor should he be prosecuted under a statute enacted
to preserve the peace.' Since the flag desecration statutes punish both
those who cause disorder and those who do not, they are overbroad and
not suitable for the protection of the public order. A more properly
written statute would prohibit creating a disturbance by burning the flag at
a time and place where the offenders knew or should have known of the
high probability that such a disturbance would result. Since none of the
statutes are so worded, they are either overbroad or enacted for a purpose
other than the prevention of public disorder.
Protection of the National Symbol
Without a doubt, Congress passed the federal Flag Desecration Act
to prevent dishonoring of the national symbol."0 6 The flag as a symbol has
incalculable value. During the Congressional discussion on the statute,
debators illustrated the flag's link with past traditions and its representa-
tion of a continuity of purpose.0 7 The flag symbolizes the power and
sovereignty of the national government. It signifies a political theory of
liberty, justice and equality. It enables Americans who cannot con-
ceptualize the traditions and the freedoms of their country to "rally 'round
the flag" and thereby demonstrate their allegiance. Those who deny
significance to such symbols forget that for many citizens, theories and
ideas are of a mysterious and inscrutable nature. The flag is the common
man's way of demonstrating his allegiance to those theories and ideas.
The Court faces the unenviable task of balancing the emotional need
103. State v. Peacock, 188 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942) ; Halter v. State, 74 Neb.
757, 105 N.W. 298 (1905) ; People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967).
104. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 399-409 (2d ed. 1969).
105. The facts in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), and People v. Radich,
53 Misc. 2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Crim. Ct. 1967), aff'd, - N.Y. 2d - , N.E.2d
- (1970), in 38 U.S.L.W. 2473 (March 10, 1970), show no threat to public order.
106. See notes 29-39 supra and accompanying text. Courts have also recognized a
need to protect the flag from acts of disgrace. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34
(1906) ; Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967) ; Halter v. State, 74 Neb.
757, 105 N.W. 298 (1905) ; United States Flag Foundation, Inc. v. Radich, 53 Misc. 2d
597, 279 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; People v. Picking, 23 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Magis. Ct.
1940), affd, 263 App. Div. 366, 33 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 644, 42 N.E.2d 741
(1942).
107. For an indication of the flag's significant attributes as expressed by Congress-
men, see 113 CONG. REc. 10380, 12898, 16442-98, A2310, A2658, A3018, A3536, A3671
(1967).
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of people to have and protect a national symbol with the right of citizens
to express their political views in an effective and peaceful manner. In the
final analysis, flag desecration statutes serve to protect the sensibilities
of the public. It cannot be too emphatically stated, however, that the First
Amendment demands the protection of even the most abhorrent speech.10 8
If the freedom of speech must be weighed, measured or balanced with
public sensibilities, then First Amendment protection is illusory. Speech
that offends no one needs no protection. Fortunately, the Supreme Court
has never recognized public sensibilities as an interest to be balanced with
the First Amendment. Therefore, once the Court identifies flag burning
as symbolic speech, the statutes prohibiting it cannot be sustained to
protect public sensibilities.'
Because the statutes may be unconstitutional does not mean that
dissenters may burn the flag with impunity. Breach of the peace statutes
protect the state from protestors who cause disorder by desecrating the
flag at a time and place where disorder is the natural and probable
consequence."'0
Interests other than the protection of public order and sensibilities
may be advanced by advocates of the flag desecration statutes. Flag
burning may encourage draft resistance, the Hanoi government, free-love
movements or any number of anti-establishment activities. It is question-
able, however, whether the level of encouragement afforded by flag
burning justifies a statute.
FLAGS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
The inevitable Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the
flag desecration statutes will either weaken the First Amendment or
arouse the animosity of the "silent majority." It is submitted that this
result is caused by a malfunctioning of the legal process. The purpose of
the flag is to symbolize not only the national government, but also the
traditions and freedoms to which the government is committed."' People
desecrate the flag when they use it in degradation of that purpose." 2
108. See notes 87-94 supra and accompanying text.
109. It is submitted that Justice Harlan was correct when he, while speaking for
the Supreme Court in Street, denounced flag desecration as deplorable and distasteful.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969). It appears that the purpose of flag burn-
ing is to polarize the two sides of an issue, making future rational debate impossible and
confrontation inevitable. It is perhaps unfortunate that Congress thought these indi-
viduals to be so important as to warrant the weakening of the First Amendment.
110. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
112. Desecration is defined by WEBsTER's THIR INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(unabr. 1961) as "violat[ing] the sanctity of by diverting from sacred purposes, by
contaminating or by defiling . . .divest[ing] of sacred character or treat[ing] as un-
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Examples, then, of flag desecration are use in advertising and the
discussion of contemporary issues." 8 Demonstrators desecrate the flag
when they burn it to dramatize disagreement with a particular policy of
the government or with a particular social viewpoint of society. Others
desecrate the flag when they "wave" it to dramatize agreement with
present governmental policy or contemporary societal norms.
Desecration of the flag by using it to camouflage issues appears
quite frequently. Pertinent arguments on the Vietnam issue are ignored
when antagonists hide behind the flag by burning it or waving it.
Political candidates insult the flag and the intelligence of the voters by
adding the national symbol to their arsenal of campaign weapons. Even
the Congressional debate on the statute turned into "patriotic" rhetoric
designed to impress the constituency." 4 There is a vast difference be-
tween the effects generated from flag burning and flag waving, but this
difference should not hide the essentiat similarity-the use of the flag
for political motives.
CONCLUSION
Once flag desecration is recognized as symbolic speech, it may only
be prohibited by the presence of a compelling and overriding state interest.
Society's interest in maintaining public order is substantial enough to
prohibit flag desecration that causes a public disruption. In the absence
of such a disruption, however, flag burning harms only the sensibilities of
the public. It is submitted that First Amendment rights should not be
abridged solely to appease public sensibilities. The problem-though not
expressed by judicial decisions to date-is how the public will accept the
decision that flag burning is constitutionally protected. Dare the Court
declare the statute unconstitutional?
The present status of the law is difficult to justify. The legislature
wishes to prevent desecration of the flag. The result is that one form of
desecration is prohibited while another desecration is allowed-a stun-
ning example of the "there ought to be a law" syndrome.
As long as people take the flag from its pedestal and employ it in
the bellicosity of political debate, there will be those who will feel free to
hallowed." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 532 (4th ed. 1951) defines desecration as "vio-
lat[ing] sanctity of, profan[ing], or put[ting] to unworthy use."
113. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1906).
114. See 113 CONG. REc. 16441-98 (1967). Not all the members of Congress par-
ticipated in the "debate." Senator Stephen Young of Ohio urged that
even though we are now engaged in the kind of armed conflict which always
tends to bring out those super-duper, hysterical, self-appointed and proclaimed
patriots, let us keep our perspective.
Id. at 13729.
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burn it. It is no accident that demonstrators have singled out the flag as a
subject of desecration. There is no respect for a symbol that debators have
continuously used to cloak the inadequacies of their arguments. The
remedy lies in the attitudes of the people-not in the law.
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Federal Statute














§ 41-1701 (Repl. 1964)
California
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 614 (West 1955)
Colorado
Colo. Sess. Laws
ch. 124, § 3, [1969]
Connecticut




tit. 11, § 533
(Supp. 1968)
knowingly casts contempt
upon . . . by publicly
mutilating, defacing, burn-
ing, or trampling upon it.
publicly mutilate, deface,
defile, defy, trample upon,
or by word or act cast
contempt upon. Whoever
publicly and contemptu-
ously burns or sets fire to
the flag . . . is guilty of
a felony.
publicly or wilfully mu-
tilates, tramples upon, or
tears down or wilfully
and maliciously removes
while owned by others or
otherwise defaces or de-
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publicly mutilate, deface,
defile, defy, trample up-
on, or by word or act cast
contempt upon
shall in any manner mu-
tilate, deface, or by word
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defile or defy, trample up-
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satirize, deride, or bur-
lesque either by words or
act
deface, damage, pollute,
or otherwise publicly phy-
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that will outrage the sen-
sibilities of persons like-
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State Pertinent Provision tion Enacted Penalty
Maryland
MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 83 (1957)
Massachusetts
MASS. GEN. LAWS
















































publicly or wilfully mutil-
ates, tramples upon, or
who tears down or wil-
fully and maliciously re-
moves while owned by
others, or defames, slan-
ders, or speaks evilly or
in a contemptuous man-
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New Hampshire







§ 40A-21-4 (Repl. 1964)
New York
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW




















tit. 18, § 4210 (1963)
PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4211 (1963)
publicly mutilate, trample
upon, defile, deface or
cast contempt upon either
by words or acts
publicly mutilates, tram-
ples upon or otherwise de-
faces or defiles










trample upon, or other-
wise cast contempt
contemptuously or mali-
ciously tear down, burn,
trample upon, mutilate,
deface, defile, defy, treat
with indignity, wantonly
destroy, or cast contempt,




takes down, injures, re-
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State Pertinent Provision tion Enacted Penalty
Rhode Island






S.D. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 22-9-1 (1967)




§ 39-1607 (Supp. 1968)
Uniform Law
(See Arizona)




deface, injure, or destroy
. . . trail it in the dust




burns, tears, muddies, or
otherwise soils or dese-
crates
TENN. CODE ANN. I Uniform Law
§ 39-1603 (Supp. 1968)1 (See Arizona)
Texas
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
art. 148 (1952)







tit. 13, § 1903 (1959)
Virginia
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-425 (Supp. 1968)
Washington
WASH. REV. CODE
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State Pertinent Provision tion Enacted Penalty
West Virginia Uniform Law 1915 1915 30 days
W. VA. CODE ANN. (See Arizona) $100
§ 61-1-8 (1966)
Wisconsin intentionally and publicly 1901 1967 1 year
WIs. STAT. mutilates, defiles, or casts $500
§ 946.05 (Supp. 1969) contempt
Wyoming publicly or wilfully mutil- 1905 1905 1 year
WYo. STAT. ANN. ates, tramples upon, or $250
§ 6-106 (1957) who tears down or wil-
fully and maliciously re-
moves while owned by
others, or otherwise de-
faces, or defiles
et al.: Flag Burning, Flag Waving, and the Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
